The need to measure the social cost of carbon dioxide emissions
The social cost of carbon refers to the estimate of the monetary value of world-wide damage done by anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions. As is well known, carbon dioxide is the oxidised form of carbon, and is the major greenhouse gas implicated in projections of global warming. The social cost is the damage done by carbon dioxide emissions compared to a baseline context in which those emissions do not increase. But it does not follow from this that the correct or socially desirable level of emissions is such that this social cost is zero. There are two reasons for this. First, greenhouse gases have long residence times in the atmosphere, so that climate damage today and in the near future is the result mainly of past, irreversible emissions. Since nothing can be done about those emissions, the relevant policy window relates to the difference between projected levels of warming from 'doing nothing' and the level of warming that will occur anyway due to time lags in the climate system. Second, economists and risk analysts will point out that the socially optimal level of any pollutant or hazard is rarely zero. This is because reducing pollution is not costless. It makes sense to reduce pollution so long as the benefit of doing so exceeds the costs. But as soon as a further incremental ('marginal') reduction in pollution incurs costs greater costs than benefits, that is the time to declare the policy measures optimal and not go any further. As we shall see, while simple to state, this costbenefit rule is immensely complicated to formulate in practice in the global warming context.
If the correct approach is to balance costs and benefits so that policies are adopted which maximise the difference between benefit and costs, it is obviously essential to have some idea of the quantitative size of those costs and benefits. The primary benefit of global warming control is the avoided damages, so it is necessary to estimate the social cost of carbon in order to estimate the damage that can be avoided. It is not necessary for this estimate of social cost to be precise. Few magnitudes in economics or in policy analysis are precise. Acting on reasonable estimates is better than acting on no estimate because the latter course of action necessarily implies a social cost. If there is uncertainty about a social cost estimate, that uncertainty does not magically disappear by not adopting the social cost estimate. Indeed, as Thomas (1963) pointed out forty years ago, it is not logically possible to avoid monetary valuation in the all-pervading contexts where policies cost money. If a policy costs $X then adopting the policy implies benefits must be at least $X and not adopting it implies that benefits are less than $X. Despite the cost-benefit logic, a substantial part of the policy-oriented literature on warming control either ignores, or explicitly rejects the commensurability of costs and benefits.
For a cost-benefit approach it is, of course, also necessary to have some idea of the costs of control, e.g. through energy conservation, slowing deforestation, switching to low and noncarbon energy technologies, and so on. Curiously, looking at what it costs an economy to adopt warming control policies tends to be widely accepted in the policy-oriented literature. What many people want is to avoid monetising benefits. They prefer to set a target based on some principle or other, and then minimise the costs of achieving the target. This is cost-effectiveness, not cost-benefit analysis. Cost-effectiveness cannot answer the question: how much should we abate? It can only answer the question: which of several competing policies should be chosen, given that we must choose one or other of those policies. The focus therefore shifts to the criteria for setting the target.
The first justification for estimating the social cost of carbon is therefore that, allied with cost of control data, it should provide us with some idea of how much abatement to undertake. Of course, if this amount of abatement is determined by some other criterion, estimating benefits is not necessary. However, as noted above, this is quite a different thing to saying that benefit estimates no longer exist: by implication they are once again at least equal to the total costs of control.
One of the policy instruments widely debated to help control carbon emissions is a carbon tax. Ideally formulated, this tax should be equal to the marginal (extra) damage done by greenhouse gases at the point where the difference between costs and benefit of control is maximised. At such a point, marginal cost of control equals the marginal benefit (i.e. the marginal avoided damage) of control. A second reason for estimating social cost is that it provides an idea of the desirable level of a carbon tax. Once again, if a target is set that is unrelated to monetised benefits, the relevant tax can still be determined since it is equal to the marginal control costs at the level of abatement set by the target.
Objections to monetary measures of social cost
The literature that opposes monetisation of damage, either generally or in the context of climate change, is substantial. Accordingly, we list only a few of the concerns. The objective here is to show that, however well-intentioned the criticisms are, some form of comparison of costs and benefits is unavoidable.
First, it is argued that the way economists measure cost and benefit produces an inequity. A cost is any loss of wellbeing and a benefit is any gain in wellbeing. Those losses and gains are measured through the notion of willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid a loss or WTP to secure a gain. They might equally well be measured by willingness to accept compensation (WTA) to tolerate the loss or forego the benefit. WTP and, less so, WTA are self-evidently influenced by wealth and income. Other things being equal, WTP will vary directly with income. Hence richer people get a bigger 'vote' than poor people. The 'unequal votes' argument appears especially powerful in the context of global warming, since, as climate damage models show (e.g. Tol 2002a, b) , those who stand to lose most relative to their income levels are the poorest in the world. Markets work by allocating resources according to WTP, so opposition to the standard economic approach tends to be associated with a wider opposition to markets generally as a means of allocating resources in society. Not all of these critics make this connection. If they did, they might however argue that global warming is 'something special', i.e. it is all right to have market-determination of resource allocation for most things, but not for global warming control. This is an argument we return to. The essential point is that how 'equity' is treated affects the size of the social cost estimate, as we shall see.
While the argument for rejecting market allocation of resources is based on equity concerns, it actually produces its own problem of equity. Unless global warming itself lowers future average incomes in poor countries -a prospect that some genuinely believe will be the case -action taken now will be for the benefit of communities who will be richer than the poorest people today. Since action has an opportunity cost, it follows that the sacrifice of resources today could be at the expense of transfers of income to poor people today. If so, the poor today may bear sacrifices in terms of foregone benefits in order to benefit their richer descendants. As Thomas Schelling (1992 has argued, one reason for the higher economic sensitivity to damage in poor countries is that poor countries are more dependent on climate-sensitive economic activity than are rich countries. It may pay, therefore, to divert funds allocated to preventing climate change to improving economic development in poor countries so as to reduce their vulnerability to climate stress. This would have the added benefit of improving the wellbeing of the poor now.
The relevant comparison is that of costs to poor people now from foregone development with benefits to their descendants in the future.
Second, monetisation as a measure of human preferences implies that those whose preferences should count are those who are living and present. Those yet to come -the future generationscannot vote and hence appear to have no say. Yet it is they who will suffer the effects of warming, and at least some responsibility for that warming rests with the current generation. By definition, then, counting only current preferences disenfranchises future generations and must surely understate the 'true' social cost of carbon. Once again, these are telling points but they are not as obviously destructive of the cost-benefit approach as they first appear. There is nothing in economics that says that any individual today is motivated solely by self-interest and that they are indifferent to other humans now or in the future, or even that they are indifferent to nonhuman wellbeing. If self-interest alone motivates choices, it would be hard to explain savings behaviour and charitable donations, for example. Future generations are not necessarily disenfranchised by the cost-benefit approach. It depends on what motivates preferences now. Nonetheless, it is true that individuals will not feel the same way for persons to come in 10,000 years time as for persons to come in 100 years time. There will be 'time discounting', an issue we return to. But even if future generations are no richer than we are, and even without discounting, it is unclear that reducing savings today to combat global warming is a better option than keeping savings high so as to leave a larger capital stock to future generations. This is Schelling's cost-benefit point again 1 . A contrary view is that of Spash (1994) who argues that (a) future generations have 'rights' to a stable global environment and (b) the harm from warming cannot be 'undone' by doing good through leaving them higher capital stocks. The noncompensability of harm is usually illustrated by saying that one cannot offset a murder by then doing good. But, it is hard to imagine any policy that would pass a test of 'do no harm' to unrepresented individuals. The brute fact of human existence necessarily implies imposing costs on future individuals, including costs of foregone lives. Moreover, much of the justice system is based on the idea that harm can be offset by good deeds. The 'do no harm' principle therefore tends to imply an illusory world in which there are no trade-offs. Further, it is philosophically unclear that non-existent future generations have 'rights' to anything since the possession of rights is predicated on the existence of the individuals in question (Pasek and Beckerman, 2000) .
The third objection to monetisation is that it implies inappropriate fine-tuning in a context where damages are likely to be catastrophic, akin to past massive extinction periods. If the scenario is for the end of the world (as we know it) in the near future, it would arguably make little sense to talk about costs and benefits. The costs of damage would be extremely high at the margin. Indeed, cost-benefit analysis requires that the variance of the net benefits from climate change control are finite (Tol, 2002d) . If total catastrophe is feasible, then the variance would be infinite. The only rational action would appear to be to stop global warming immediately. But this is an empirical question, not a certainty by any means. No-one appears to argue that catastrophe consists of the destruction of the entire human race. Rather the kinds of events that are discussed are the melting of the West Antarctic ice sheet or reversal of the gulf stream. Thus it seems more correct to refer to extremely high marginal damages occurring with some unknown probability, rather than marginal damages being infinite. Even if catastrophe were a certainty, when it happens matters. If it happens in 10,000 years that is quite different to it happening in 100 years unless we believe that all lives are 'equal' regardless of when they occur 2 . So, there is uncertainty about the scale of damage and uncertainty about when that damage will occur. The appropriate action to avoid catastrophe still has to be informed by some notion of what it costs to avoid it, what the likelihood is of it occurring, when it occurs and the degree of risk aversion. Deciding how averse we are to these risks in turn implies some assessment of the damages from catastrophes, and this is in fact a feature of more recent attempts to measure the social cost of carbon -see for example Downing et al. (1996) , Gjerde et al. (1998) , Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) . Costs and benefits still need to be compared.
The final objection to monetisation is that it is not necessary in a context where the goal is one of sustainable development . Two competing interpretations of the meaning of sustainable development largely explain the differences in approach. An economic definition of sustainable development is framed in terms of rising per capita levels of wellbeing through time. This definition says nothing about the time-horizon, but that might be inferred from analysis of preferences such that the 'end of time' is the future time where current concern for the future declines to zero. This reflects the point made earlier, namely that most people would not express a concern for humans 10,000 years from now, but might for humans 100 years from now. Clearly, this view is inconsistent with the notion that future generations have 'rights' to a stable or at least less warm environment than would otherwise be the case. An alternative interpretation is that sustainable development is about ensuring humans are present on Earth indefinitely. For example, Ekins (2000) says that 'The basic meaning of sustainability is the capacity for continuance (sic) more or less indefinitely into the future'. Just as the economic definition is hazy on the range of time over which per capita wellbeing should rise, so this non-economic definition says nothing about per capita wellbeing. It seems better to brand this notion of sustainability 'survivability'. The maximand becomes the survival time of humans on Earth. One obvious difficulty is that this maximand is consistent with each generation going to subsistence level in order to insure against threats to the existence of later generations. The result is akin to that arising from assuming that one should not discount the future, i.e. that the discount rate is zero (Olson and Bailey, 1981) 3 .
But if sustainability is about survival, the argument would be that there are certain thresholds beyond which pollution and resource extraction should not go. At these thresholds, the renewability of resources would be ensured and pollution would not exceed the assimilative capacities of receiving environments. Whatever it costs to secure these thresholds is what would have to be spent to ensure sustainability. There is then no need to measure policy benefits because the 'right' level of expenditure is pre-determined. The approach is exemplified by Ekins (2000) who argues for the identification of sustainability targets and for measuring the cost of achieving them. This approach is consistent with cost-effectiveness but obviously not with costbenefit.
The problems with this approach are many. Most importantly, as noted above, 'sustainability' and 'survivability' are not the same thing. Second, even if the notion of maximising survival time was widely accepted, or imposed dictatorially, the costs of achieving 'sustainability' are being compared quite explicitly with the benefits of prolonged human occupation of the Earth. Third, the examples Ekins gives of sustainability thresholds relate to global warming and acidic pollutants. The latter can indeed be linked to notions of zero risk, i.e. the achievement of critical loads 4 , but the former, as Ekins acknowledges, has no obvious threshold. The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, for example, did not quantify the goal of 'stabilisation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system' (Article 2). But even if sustainability thresholds can be defined for these two issues, what would the comparable thresholds be for global deforestation, coral reef loss, marine fisheries loss, particulate matter emissions, radiation, etc? All of these resources would qualify as being qualitatively as important as, say, acid rain. Consider pollution in general. Given that a great many pollutants have dose-response functions that are linear homogenous, the only 'safe' level of those pollutants is zero. On a survivability criterion, the only 'sustainable' level of pollution is zero. Ekins (2000) argues that the sustainability thresholds are goals that do not have to be met and that they would be set by representative political institutions. They are, perhaps, more akin to aspirations. He admits that the extent to which they are achieved would have to be compared to the cost of achievement, which is exactly how acid rain targets are interpreted in practice. But as soon as costs become relevant, it is logically impossible to argue that benefits are not being estimated. The implicit or explicit nature of the benefit estimation is not material: the fact is that benefits are being estimated. Moreover, arguing that whatever political institutions do is what is socially acceptable negates the entire purpose of policy appraisal. Governments are not maximisers of social wellbeing, hence appraisal techniques based on that goal need to be practised in order to provide information and persuasion to governments.
The conclusion of this discussion must be that costs and benefits always have to be compared, and this should be done explicitly rather than rejecting the approach and then adopting it under another guise. We can now turn to the social cost of carbon.
Modelling the social cost of carbon
The available quantitative estimates of the social cost of carbon emissions 5 adopt models of varying degrees of sophistication. The essential linkages in all models are from emissions to atmospheric concentration, from concentrations to temperature change, and from temperature change to damage. The last link also involves an intermediate stage going from temperature change to sea level rise. Highly simplified, the underlying form of the models is as follows. We work in discrete time for simplicity 6 .
First, total damage done, V, from the emission of one tonne of greenhouse gas (say, carbon) will be equal to the present value of all future incremental damages, E D ∂ ∂ , since the carbon resides in the atmosphere for a long period. Hence, with t denoting time, we have:
Second, atmospheric concentrations (C) of carbon are linked to emissions (E) via:
where L is the residence time of carbon in the atmosphere and ß is a factor that convert emissions (tonnes) into concentrations (parts per million). The first expression on the right hand side captures the decay process, i.e. the rate at which carbon is removed from the atmosphere, e.g. by oceans.
Third, the link between temperature change and changes in carbon concentrations in the atmosphere constitutes the climate change section of the model. Climate change models are complex, but the essence is captured in two equations:
T is temperature, U refers to the upper ocean layer and L to the lower ocean layer, R refers to the thermal capacity of the ocean layers, F is radiative forcing, ? is the transfer rate between upper and lower ocean layers, and ? is a parameter showing how much temperature changes for a given increase in radiative forcing. Equation [4] tries to capture the process whereby radiative forcing heats up the atmosphere, which then heats up the upper ocean which then heats up the lower ocean.
The final basic equation links annual damage, D, to temperature, T:
The parameter ? is the amount of warming (in o C) associated with a doubling of CO 2 concentrations 7 . t* is the year in which that doubling is expected to occur, usually taken to be 2050. If temperature rises by 1% damage, D, rises by ?%, i.e. ? links temperature and damage. φ is a parameter that makes impacts greater if they occur before t* and lower if they occur after t* -an attempt to account for damage being related to speed of change. If the temperature rise associated with 2xCO 2 is 2.5 o C, then ?=2.5. If the temperature rise that actually occurs is 2.5 o C, and if t* = t^, then D t = k t where k t is the estimated damage done by 2xCO 2 . This figure is estimated from 'bottom up' approaches whereby sectoral damage is estimated region by region (or, in the early studies, for the USA alone). Damage will rise with time due to population growth and income expansion according to:
where y is the rate of growth of income per capita, p is the rate of growth of population, and ? is the income elasticity of willingness to pay to avoid damage. It is readily seen that the values of these three parameters can substantially influence estimates of future damage. For example, Fankhauser (1995) adopts a value of ? = 1.0 whereas subsequent literature (Pearce, 2003) suggests that it is more likely to be 0.3-0.4. For a rate of income growth of ,say, 2 per cent, ?.y will be 2 per cent if ? = 1, but only 0.6 per cent if ? = 0.3.
Even with such a comparatively simple model, it is easy to see that differing estimates of the social cost of carbon are likely to emerge. The example of the assumed value of ? shows this. But there is also considerable debate about the choice of discount rate, and even the parameters in the climate section of the model. It should occasion no surprise that social cost estimates will vary. The key parameters in such models are usually treated as being random so that the actual figures reported by the models tend to be ranges.
To see how the model works, we borrow the numbers in Fankhauser ( The marginal social cost of carbon is given by the derivative of V with respect to E in equation [1] . This records the change in the present value of all future damages from releasing one extra tonne of carbon in the present period. As greenhouse gases are cumulative, the marginal social figure will tend to increase with time. Population and income growth, as shown in equation [6] , will also cause marginal social cost to rise.
Estimates of 2xCO 2 damage (k t )
While the policy focus of the social cost of carbon is on the estimates of marginal social cost, it is useful to look at the various measures of aggregate world social cost. In integrated assessment (mixed climate and economic models) this aggregate is benchmarked on a scenario in which pre-industrial carbon dioxide concentrations are doubled. Table 1 assembles the available estimates. The studies shown are recent and are compared to the 'first generation' of models which were surveyed in the IPCC Second Assessment (Pearce et al, 1996) . The important feature of the post-1996 studies is that some of them make allowance for adaptation to climate change, and some include catastrophes. The role of adaptation can be illustrated by the 'dumb farmer syndrome'. Damage occurs to, say, crops and in the no-adaptation case the farmer simply suffers a loss of output and profits. In the adaptation case, efforts are undertaken to switch into climate-resistant crops. Climate change with adaptation is self-evidently far more realistic, but the scope for adaptation is also likely to be less in the developing world than the developed world. Hence, even under adaptation models, the poor are likely to lose more than the rich. This is borne out by the models (details are not shown here -see, for example, Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) . The main model involving adaptation is that of Mendelsohn et al. (1996) (see also Mendelsohn and Neumann, 1999) . It can be seen on this model that, on balance, the world actually gains from CO 2 doubling. The main model accounting for catastrophes is that of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) . The importance of catastrophes in their work is that they account for two-thirds of the world damages (1.5% GNP loss compared to 0.5 o C without catastrophes). Tol's recent work suggests the world might gain significantly at around 2 per cent of GNP. Overall, then, the recent work suggests a range of damages, the lower bound of which is consistent with the first generation models surveyed by Pearce et al. (1996) and the upper bound of which is a significant gain in world GNP. These aggregate figures masks the differential impacts on developed and developing countries, so that an equity problem remains even if there are net gains overall.
Estimates of the marginal social cost of carbon
Not all studies reporting warming damage costs, report marginal social costs. Table 2 brings together the various estimates. The basis of the table is the set of estimates gathered in Clarkson and Deyes (2002) 8 , but other studies have been added. The studies not in the Clarkson-Deyes document are marked *. Comparison is difficult because of (a) the differing methodologies in the studies and (b) variations in the underlying assumptions about climate sensitivity and economic parameters. All estimates are especially sensitive to the discount rate. In Table 2 , variations in the discount rate are given for the 'pure time preference rate' (the rate at which wellbeing is discounted), ?, and the overall social time preference rate, s 9 . Methodologies differ according to whether they are (a) based on a cost-benefit model (CBA), in which case the marginal social cost of carbon is the marginal damage done at the optimal level of abatement, (b) based on a 'marginal cost' (MC) approach in which case incremental damage is measured relative to a small increase in emissions now. As Clarkson and Deyes (2002) note, the MC approach should yield higher estimates than the CBA approach. One other methodology is shown here. Schauer's study (Schauer, 1992) uses expert valuations based on either getting experts to say what they think the most likely parameter values are, or getting them to estimate directly the marginal social cost.
What can be gleaned from table 2? One problem in comparing studies concerns the discount rate. Values are reported for the pure time preference rate in some studies and for the overall discount rate in others. Assuming income growth of 2 per cent p.a and an elasticity of marginal utility of income of -1, a pure time preference rate of 1 per cent would correspond to a social discount rate of 3 per cent, and so on. On this assumption, the recent estimates clearly fall into two categories. The Nordhaus-Boyer, Tol (1999) , Roughgarden and Schneider, and Tol and Downing studies all produce near-term estimates in the bracket $4-9 tc for a discount rate of 3 per cent , and -$7 to +$15 for a discount rate of 5 per cent. Tol and Downing's estimate for a 2 per cent discount rate is $20 tC. To some extent there is overlap: the Roughgarden and Schneider study uses Tol's estimates as an input. But Tol and Downing use a quite different model to Tol (1999) . The second category is the Eyre et al. study which produces around $40-50 tC for s=3 and $20-37 tC for s = 5. The basic difference between the Eyre study and the TolDowning study is that the latter incorporates adaptive behaviour. As noted above, it is a serious weakness of an integrated model if it lacks adaptation -see also Mendelsohn (1999) 10 . The Eyre et al. study uses as one of its models 'FUND 1.6' which was developed by Tol. The Tol and Downing study, however, uses an update (FUND 2.0) which reflects the more recent literature on adaptation. Accordingly, the Tol-Downing figures are likely to be more reliable. The other major study, and one which has the virtue also of including catastrophes, is Nordhaus-Boyer. Since Nordhaus-Boyer is a CBA study and Tol-Downing work is based on MC, we would expect the Tol-Downing estimates to lie above those of Nordhaus-Boyer on this criterion, but perhaps below it because of the greater sensitivity to catastrophe in the Nordhaus-Boyer model. In fact the Tol-Downing range encompasses the entire range in Nordhaus-Boyer. The upper bound of Tol-Downing reflects a pure time preference of 0%, and this is inconsistent with the Olson-Bailey (1982) argument that time preference must be positive. However, it is consistent with positive discounting for income growth. Note that the lower bound of Tol-Downing is negative, i.e. there are net global benefits. The value of $3.5 tC for ? = 1 can be compared to the Nordhaus-Boyer estimate for s= 3 of $9.1. Since s = 3 is a reasonable representation of a social discount rate, the probable range of marginal (unweighted) damages is in the region of $4-9 tC.
The UK Government and the social cost of carbon
As indicated at the outset, some measure of the social cost of carbon is required to determine an optimal policy based on human preferences. The UK Government, via DEFRA, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, released a document early in 2002 on the social cost of carbon (Clarkson and Deyes, 2002) 11 . This is a workmanlike and well-researched document. Interestingly it was not released as a DEFRA publication but as a Government Economic Service Working Paper. It does not therefore appear with any of the other publications on climate change policy, but in a format likely to be accessed only by diligent researchers. It carries a disclaimer to the effect that the views in the document are those of the authors and not necessarily those of DEFRA. All this suggests that the document was not intended to be high profile. Indeed, effort appears to have been made to avoid giving it publicity. Nonetheless, it is public and deserves to be public. However, while the literature surveyed is generally well documented (the main exception is the Nordhaus-Boyer work which is significant and is not mentioned), the conclusion is starkly at odds with that reached here at the end of the last section. Our conclusion was that an unweighted 'price' of $4-9 tC, or, roughly, £UK3-6 tC is probably 10 Plambeck-Hope (1996) is one of the few earlier studies to consider adaptation and non-adaptation within a single model. Without adaptation, marginal social costs are $32 tC, with adaptation they are $21 tC. 11 DEFRA have also released official guidance for 'Whitehall' on the use of the £70 tC figure that emerges from the Clarkson-Deyes paper -see DEFRA (2002) . about right. The conclusion in Clarkson-Deyes is that the right price is £70 tC, 4-23 times as high.
There are two basic explanations for the difference in these estimates. First, Clarkson-Deyes opt for the Eyre et al. study as being 'more sophisticated'. Second, they then double the figures for equity weighting.
Clarkson-Deyes opt for the figures in the Eyre et al. (1997) 12 study which they revise as follows. Two adjustments are made to the original figures: (a) an adjustment for inflation to convert 1990 prices into 2000 prices. This is implicitly put at 28% in the early text but cited as 35% in Table 1 of Clarkson-Deyes and elsewhere in the text; and (b) an adjustment for the base year of emissions. Table 3 shows the original Eyre et al figures (both without equity weighting) and the Clarkson-Deyes figures. 
Equity weighting
The second major adjustment in the Clarkson-Deyes study is for equity weighting. It was noted earlier that, expressed as a proportion of per capita incomes, damage from global warming is higher in the developing world than in the developed world. An obvious issue of equity arises since $1 of damage to a poor person should attract a higher weight than $1 of damage to a rich person. In the original survey of damage estimates for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Pearce et al. (1996) noted that damage estimates were based on willingness to pay, and they showed how equity weights could be introduced. Subsequent and somewhat manipulated criticism of the absence of actual equity-weighted estimates in the IPCC report produced a sequence of revised estimates using various forms of equity weighting (Fankhauser et al. 1997a (Fankhauser et al. , 1997b Tol et al. 1996 Tol et al. , 1999 . One obvious problem with equity-weighting is that any number of social welfare functions (SWFs) can be postulated, each producing different weightings and hence different overall climate damage figures and different marginal social cost estimates 16 . However, just like 'not discounting', 'not equity weighting' implies a value of an equity weight equal to unity, i.e. $1 of damage to a poor person is treated as if it is the same as $1 of loss to a rich person. Hence there is no procedure that avoids explicit or implicit equity weighting and it seems better to consider 'reasonable' SWFs and see what they imply for climate damage. Y is average world per capita income, Y i is income of the ith person, P refers to poor people, D is damage, and e is the elasticity of the marginal utility of income schedule, a measure of 'inequality aversion'. In [7} damage to all individuals counts but anyone below the average world per capita income secures a weight greater than unity, and anyone 15 Clarkson and Deyes cite as suggesting that FUND 2.0 may be 'optimistic, perhaps too optimistic'. However, Tol and Downing (2000) also remark that 'FUND 1.6…..may be too pessimistic'. 16 A social welfare function (SWF) is a rule for aggregating individual levels of human wellbeing, or welfare. Selfevidently, there is an extremely large class of possibilities for choosing weights to apply to these levels of wellbeing, each rule reflecting some value judgement about 'deservingness'. 17 For more discussion of other SWFs and the choice of weighting factors, see Tol (2001) , Azar (1999) and Azar and Sterner (1996) . above secures a weight below unity, the size of the weight varying with the degree of inequality aversion. In [8] only damage to poor people counts, all other damage is given a weight of zero 18 . Generally, SWFs of the form shown in [7] have been the ones used in illustrating the effects of equity weighting on global warming damage. It can be seen that what matters is then the distribution of the initial level of damage between rich and poor regions, the income disparity between rich and poor, and the value of e. Since, by and large, there is little dispute about real income data, variations in the estimates of global damage will therefore derive from the values chosen for D R /D P and e.
To illustrate how the SWF is estimated, we rewrite it as:
where R = rich and P = poor. Crude estimates of the relevant magnitudes are then D R = $216 billion and D P = $106 billion, for 2 x CO 2 (Fankhauser, 1995) ; Y R = $10,000, and Y P = $1110; and Y-bar = $3333 19 . Substituting in [9] produces estimates of world damage of unweighted $ 322 billion weighted, e = 0.5 $ 307 billion weighted, e = 0.8 $ 343 billion weighted, e = 1 $ 390 billion weighted, e = 1.5 $ 600 billion
Despite the rough and ready nature of the exercise, these numbers are consistent with those produced in Fankhauser et al. (1997) . In that paper, e = 0.5 makes hardly any difference to the unweighted damage estimate, and e = 1 produces a 25% increase on the unweighted damages.
Only if e > 1 do the aggregate damages increase markedly. In contrast, Tol's (1995) estimates of total damage increase by nearly 70% on the unweighted damages for e = 1. The reason for this is that Tol has a larger share of world damages accruing to the developing world. The value of e obviously matters. The value of e in Eyre et al. is unity, and Clarkson and Deyes also opt for a value of unity, based on a survey of some of the literature.
Two issues now arise. First, is e = 1 the correct estimate of e? Second, even if e = 1 what does it imply for a multiplication factor for the marginal social cost of carbon? As noted above, the answer to the second question depends on how estimates of aggregate damage are distributed between rich and poor countries.
The value of e
In their review, Clarkson and Deyes (2002) opt for a value of e = 1. In their review of the previous literature, Pearce and Ulph (1999) observe that the apparent consensus in the literature on the value of e such that 0.5 < e < 1.5 is based on a faulty reading of the literature. Details are not provided here, and the reader is referred to Pearce and Ulph (1999) . However, one of the mistaken pieces of literature is that of Kula (1987) to which Clarkson and Deyes refer in support of their view that e = 1 20 . Clarkson and Deyes' second source of values for e is an excellent survey paper by Cowell and Gardiner (1999) . This survey suggests that work on savings behaviour implies a value of e 'just below or just above one' (p.31); that work on implied values of e taken from UK tax schedules implies a range 1.2 to 1.4; and that experimental work produces values of around 4. Cowell and Gardiner conclude that 'a reasonable range seems to be from 0.5 ….to 4' (p.33) 21 . The selected value in Pearce and Ulph (1999) , based on the same savings models as are surveyed in Cowell and Gardiner (1999) , is 0.8
22 . Values below unity should therefore be entertained seriously. Values such as 4, however, imply a quite dramatic degree of inequality aversion. To see this consider two nations, rich and poor, with utility functions of the form:
The ratio of the two marginal utilities is given by:
Suppose Y R = 10Y P as is the case for international real income comparisons between OECD countries and others. What this tells us is that at e = 4, the social value of extra income to R is zero. At e = 1, a marginal unit of income to the poor is valued ten times the marginal gain to the rich. At e = 2, the relative valuation is 100 times. On this 'thought experiment' basis, then, values even of e = 2 do not seem reasonable. A value of e = 1 does seem feasible. Overall, looking at the implied values of e in savings behaviour and at the thought-experiment above, values of e in the range 0.5 to 1.2 seem reasonable. 20 Clarkson and Deyes cite this paper as 1997 but do not give a reference for any paper by Kula in the references. We have assumed they mean Kula (1987) . 21 Clarkson and Deyes quote the first summary statement in Cowell and Gardiner, but not the second. 22 Clarkson and Deyes make a curious remark about deriving e for savings models, saying that 'it reflects transferring income through time to one's self or to one's children and does not reflect the transfer of income to others in other parts of the world' (p.53). But none of the studies surveyed in Cowell and Gardiner or Pearce and Ulph reflect the value of e implicit in foreign transfers, unless the value of e implied by taxation is thought to represent this. A moment's reflection would show that the implicit value of e in UK foreign aid behaviour is very small. Clarkson and Deyes (2002) suggest that equity weighting with e = 1 roughly doubles the unweighted estimates. As noted earlier, however, this depends on the distribution of absolute damages between rich and poor. Hence the difference made by equity weighting to unweighted estimates of marginal social cost is model-dependent. Moreover, the multiplication factor varies with the discount rate, as one would expect. Table 4 reports the results for FUND 1.6, FUND 2.0 and OF ('Open Framework') which is also used in both Eyre et al. (1997) and Tol and Downing (2000) . Results are shown only for near-term emissions.
From unweighted social cost estimates to weighted cost estimates
The estimates of damage vary according to the discount rate and according to the methodology used for valuing statistical lives lost. The 'VSL' approach values a statistical life at the WTP for risk reduction divided by the size of the risk. This produces VSL estimates of several millions of dollars. The VLY approach seeks to avoid one of the problems with the VSL approach, namely that WTP appears to be very high for relatively small savings in life years. Hence WTP for a saved life-year appears more appropriate. However, the VLY approach adopted in Tol and Downing (2000) is that of the ExternE programme and it has been noted elsewhere that there is no economic rationale for this procedure (Pearce, 1998) . Nonetheless, we report the estimates here. Table 4 suggests that the 'equity multiplier' varies with the model, the discount rate and with the use of VSL or VLY. But all multipliers are contained within the bracket 0.9 to 3.6, embracing Clarkson-Deyes 'rule of thumb' of doubling the estimates. This range also applies if FUND 2.0 is the preferred model.
Discounting
The sensitivity of social cost estimates to the discount rate is well established. However, there is a further issue concerning the discount rate which is not addressed in any of the integrated assessment models, nor in the Clarkson-Deyes paper. They all assume a constant rate of discount, i.e. one that does not vary with time. Recent work is firmly suggesting, however, that discount rates for long term issues such as global warming decline with time (Weitzman (1998 (Weitzman ( , 1999 , Gollier (2002, forthcoming) , Pizer (2000, 2001) . The essence of these approaches is that either or both future discount rates and economic growth rates are uncertain. Uncertainty about the discount rate drives the results obtained in Weitzman (1998 Weitzman ( , 1998 and Pizer (2000,2001) , and uncertainty about future economic growth drives the results obtained in Gollier (2002) 23 . The argument can be illustrated by looking at uncertainty about the discount rate. What is uncertain is the discount factor (i.e. 1/(1+r) t ) since this is the temporal weight attached to future periods in terms of today's preferences. Suppose the discount rate and hence the discount factor is not known with certainty and is a random variable. Suppose it takes the values 1…6% each with a probability of 0.167. Table 5 shows the relevant values. Table 4 The effects of equity weighting on the marginal social cost of carbon 23 A further class of models derive declining discount rates from social choice axioms in which neither the present nor the 'distant future' is allowed to dictate outcomes. See Chichilnisky (1996) and Li and Löfgren (2000 Note: DF 10 = discount factor for year 10, etc. r* is the value of r that solves the equation shown in the text.
While the weighted average (expected value) of the discount rate stays the same in all periods (3.5%), the discount factor obviously varies with time. The value of the implicit discount rate, s*, is given by the equation: where n = the number of possible discount rates, DF is the discount factor and t is time. Table 5 shows that the 'certainty equivalent' discount rate goes down over time even though the average discount rate stays the same for each period.
Uncertainty about the future value of the discount factor is thus sufficient to generate a timevarying discount rate. Just what the time-path of this rate is varies according to the model chosen for simulating the effects of the uncertainty. Newell and Pizer (2001) work with the NordhausBoyer 'DICE' model of climate change and show that the marginal social cost of carbon in the model needs to be multiplied further by the following factors: s = 2%: 1.07 to 1.56 s = 4%: 1.14 to 1.82 s = 7%: 1.21 to 1.95 where the ranges reflect two different approaches to simulating future uncertainty based on long run historic interest rates in the USA. While Newell and Pizer do not consider equity weighting, the multiplication procedure is just as applicable to equity weighted damages as it is to unweighted damages. This suggest that there are two potentially major adjustments to unweighted social cost estimates, one for equity across current generations and one for timevarying discount rates.
Conclusions on the marginal social cost of carbon
We conclude that the 'base case' estimate of the marginal social cost of carbon is $4-9 tC without equity weighting and using a constant discount rate. This may understate damage due to the omission of very major catastrophes and due to the omission of 'socially contingent' damages, e.g. the costs of any induced mass human migration. However, the range may overstate damage because the integrated assessment models generally exclude any amenity benefits from global warming. That the amenity benefits may be significant is evidenced by the contributions in Maddison (2001a) . For example, Mendelsohn (2001) finds that warming generates potential benefits to the US economy of some 0.5% of its GNP. Frijters and van Praag (2001) find some benefits to Russian households, Maddison (2001b) finds beneficial amenity effects in the UK, whilst Maddison (2001c) finds evidence of a small net cost in India. While Clarkson and Deyes (2002) stress the likelihood of understatement of costs they make no mention of potential amenity benefits.
Assuming e =1, and applying the lowest equity weight to the highest discount rate, and the highest weights to the lowest discount rate, equity weighting changes the marginal social cost estimate from $4-9 tC to $3.6-22.5 tC. In UK sterling this is around £2.4 to £15 tC, compared to the Clarkson-Deyes estimate of £70. Thus the choice of model matters enormously. Choosing a model with high baseline unweighted marginal social cost automatically produces a very high equity weighted estimate. Moreover, this range makes no allowance for values of e less than and greater than unity. So, it would be easy to expand the range in terms of both the lower and upper bounds.
The effect of allowing for time-varying discount rates is to raise both sets of estimates by perhaps 80% again, taking the upper bound of the Newell-Pizer estimates (which they prefer). This would make the Clarkson-Deyes estimates around £126 tC, and the estimates suggested here about £4.3 to £27 tC.
Some policy implications of the social cost of carbon estimates
There are many policy issues arising from considerations of costs and benefits of climate change control. We select the following issues: First, does UK policy on climate change pass a costbenefit test? Second, if equity weighting is accepted, what are its implications for policy generally? Third, what are the implications for energy policy -in particular, what are the implications for nuclear power and for a carbon tax? Finally, we look at the implications for modifying the national accounting system in the UK.
Does UK climate policy pass a cost-benefit test?
The UK is a member of the European Union and the European Union has ratified the Kyoto Protocol. This process of ratification makes the targets legally binding within the Union, regardless of what else happens to the Protocol. The burden sharing agreement within the EU gives the UK a legally binding target of 88.8% of 1990 emissions for all greenhouse gases 24 . Hence it could be argued that the relevant cost figure is not the marginal social cost of damage, but the marginal abatement cost at this level of emission reduction. The targets have been agreed and hence the implied total social cost of carbon 25 must be above whatever the total abatement cost is, and the marginal social cost must be above the marginal abatement cost.
There are several powerful reasons for not adopting this argument. First, it comes close to falling into the trap noted at the beginning, namely that whatever governments agree to do is in some sense the 'right' thing. The purpose of appraisal procedures such as cost-benefit analysis, however, is to cast light on those decisions and to check whether they meet reasonable criteria for justifying policy. Otherwise there would be no point in policy analysis: the solution is Panglossian -whatever happens happens for the best. Second, the UK government espouses cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, HM Treasury issues guidance on policy appraisal that makes it quite clear that cost-benefit analysis should be used to guide policy, whilst accepting that net benefit gains are not the only criterion for good policy (HM Treasury, 2002) . Third, the Kyoto Protocol has to be the first in a sequence of Protocols or amendments -the Protocol itself does little or nothing to reduce rates of warming (Pearce, 2002) . While it might be expedient to allow ratification of one agreement that fails a cost-benefit test, it would seem distinctly unwise to allow ratification of future agreements if they systematically fail a cost-benefit test. As Clarkson and Deyes (2002) note, abatement costs are likely to rise through time, so that the cost burden on UK citizens will rise. Does the UK's commitment to the Kyoto Protocol pass a cost-benefit test? If the Clarkson-Deyes estimate of £70 tC for marginal social cost is correct, then it would. Dames and Moore (1999) estimate UK marginal abatement costs at £45 tC ($79), so that Kyoto comfortably passes the test. The test is even more comfortably met if time-varying discount rates are used. But if the estimates of the social cost of carbon suggested earlier are correct (upper bound of £15 tC) then Kyoto fails the test, and significantly so. The test is also not met even with time-varying discount rates. What of stricter targets? Dames and Moore (1999) suggest that a 20% CO 2 reduction (on 1990 as a base year) would have a marginal abatement cost of £100 tC at 2000 prices 26 , implying that such a target would fail a cost-benefit test on both the figures favoured here and on the Clarkson-Deyes figure. However, this target would pass a cost-benefit test if time-varying discount rates are adopted. Of course, marginal social costs are likely to rise through time due to the cumulative nature of emissions and the income elasticity of willingness to pay. However, as noted earlier, the latter adjustment has tended to be based on very sketchy inspection of the income elasticity literature and there is little evidence to support the use of the projections that tend to be made in integrated climate models.
Overall, UK climate policy may or may not pass a cost-benefit test, depending on the climate damage model chosen. On balance we suggest it does not. Public documents that produce social cost estimate below estimated abatement costs have the potential for being politically embarrassing, but it is just as arguable that the emphasis that positive net benefit estimates give to emissions reduction may be at the cost of better directed policies, e.g. by investing in adaptation, especially in the developing world. The DEFRA guidance on the social cost of carbon (DEFRA, 2002) comes perilously close to suggesting that the £70 tC figure is a convenient justification for the UK's climate change policy to achieve its (modified) Kyoto target:
'In addition, the figure is likely to be at least roughly consistent with the level of effort that will be needed to meet our international commitments on climate change' (DEFRA, 2002, para.10) .
Is equity weighting justified?
As noted above, equity weighting has a firm rationale in what might be termed unreconstructed utilitarianism. On this approach, what matters are 'utils' rather than magnitudes reflecting willingness to pay. Hence some form of equity weighting is justified on moral utilitarian grounds. Other moral judgements will produce different sets of weights. Economics has nothing to say about which welfare function should be chosen. Indeed, it is not easy to think of a metaethical principle that would justify one function rather than another. Nonetheless, those functions illustrated earlier tend to be the ones that have influenced the climate change literature.
But once equity weighting is adopted, it has to be adopted consistently. One virtue of policy appraisal procedures is that they provide a framework for at least guiding policy measures so that they allocate resources across government expenditures in a consistent manner. On this basis it is not logical to argue that equity weighting applies to global warming control but not to any other form of government policy. This is perhaps the second major weakness of the Clarkson-Deyes document, which is otherwise excellent 27 . They come too close to arguing that global warming control is generically different to other policies:
'The fact that the developed world is responsible for the majority of the damage inflicted makes this issue different to foreign aid and other similar policies. Equity weighting goes some way to incorporating the full impact of our emissions on others into our policy making, which is in line with the polluter pays principle' (p52).
But, as noted earlier, trying morally to ring-fence global warming control from all other policies is indefensible. Not giving foreign aid imposes a potentially substantial cost on the developing world and that is an act of deliberate policy 28 . Using resource to combat global warming is at the potential expense of foreign aid and other transfers. The World Bank estimates that OECD country policies of industrial and agricultural protection cost the developing world over $100 billion per annum now, twice the annual flow of official aid (World Bank, 2002) . It is hard to see any empirical or moral distinction between action that damages the immediate wellbeing of the poor, and does so quite consciously, and warming damage from rich country emissions that will affect mainly future generations. Equity weighting in which the weights are not unity is not therefore an option for one area of policy and not for others. Yet, once that is accepted, the implications for appraisal procedures are substantial. Interestingly, and for the first time, UK Treasury appraisal guidance quite explicitly recommends equity weighting (HM Treasury, 2002, Chapter 4 and Annex 6) . However, it is unclear from the text if the full implications have been recognised. First, one of the criteria for deciding whether to equity weight is 'whether there is an explicit distributional rationale to the proposal under consideration ' (p.49) . This would obviously fit foreign aid decisions, but it is not clear that the Treasury Guidance is meant to extend to this budget-level decision. It ought clearly to affect any decision about state aid to agriculture and industry, both of which have formidable implications for the wellbeing of poor nations. Second, the Treasury text reads as if the decisions to be appraised with equity weights are those that are confined to UK geographical boundaries, i.e. the relevant weights are to be applied to the social distribution of income within the UK.
The social cost of carbon and energy policy: a carbon tax Any carbon tax should, on cost-benefit grounds, be equal to the marginal damage from global warming at the point where marginal damage equals marginal control cost: the 'Pigovian' solution. Alternatively, if benefit estimation is not pursued, the tax should equal the marginal control cost at the target level of emission reduction. The UK does not have a pure carbon tax, but does have two taxes that are considered to be climate-related taxes. These are the climate change levy (CCL) and the fuel duty escalator (FDE).
The CCL is a tax on fossil fuels and electricity. Whilst explicitly introduced as a climate control tax, political considerations dictated that it would not vary directly with the carbon content of fuels. In other words, it is not, as it should be, a carbon tax. The 2000 Budget confirmed the following tax rates -there are several discounts and exemptions so that the effective tax rate is not easy to calculate. Here we have taken the pre-allowance tax rates.
Coal: 0.15 pence kWh Gas: 0.15 pence kWh Electricity: 0.43 pence kWh These rates can be converted into carbon taxes as follows:
Coal £16 per tonne C Gas £30 per tonne C Electricity £31 per tonne C absorb 6% of their GNP in domestic health service expenditure and only 0.2% of their GNP in foreign aid. If 'lives are equal' and the marginal cost of saving life is lower in developing countries, as it is, then such a disparity could not be justified.
Clearly, if the CCL was a carbon tax, the tax rate per tonne of carbon would be the same. Nonetheless, what we have is a range of £16 to £31 tC. This range can be compared to the £70 tC marginal damage figure. If marginal damages do not change with control effort -a reasonable first cut assumption -then the correct 'Pigovian' tax rate is also £70 tC, two to four times the implicit carbon tax in the CCL. The £70 tC figure would therefore justify a substantial increase in the CCL, even allowing for the fact that the CCL is a long way from being a proper carbon tax.
The second form of carbon tax is the fuel duty escalator (FDE). The FDE was introduced in 1993 by the then Conservative Government as a perpetual increase in the real price of petroleum fuels. It was also explicitly introduced as a climate-related tax, although in later years the message as to the purpose of the tax became very confused (Pearce, 2001 ). It was abandoned as an automatically rising tax in late 2000 after the 'fuel tax protests'. Taking the escalator between 1993 and 1999, the nominal increase in FDE amounted to some 21p/litre for gasoline and about 25p/litre for diesel 29 . In real terms -the relevant basis for the environmental component of the FDE -this was about 17pence per litre and 21 pence per litre respectively. But a £70 tC marginal damage tax corresponds to a tax per litre of 4.4 pence for gasoline and about 5 pence per litre for diesel 30 . If all the FDE was intended to be solely a carbon tax, then the tax rate went well beyond what would be justified by the £70 tC damage figure, by a factor of five, and even further beyond what would be justified by a the lower marginal damage figures suggested here. However, as noted above, the precise purpose of the tax became blurred over the years. Tax rates beyond 4-5 pence per litre could be justified by including other pollutants -as was implied in some public pronouncements.
The social cost of carbon and energy policy: choice of fuel It should also be obvious that the number chosen for the marginal social cost of carbon should also affect the design of energy policy. Consider the topical issue of the future of nuclear power in the UK. British Energy has not found it possible to compete in the electricity market in the wake of falling electricity prices. This is because nuclear electricity private costs are greater than, say, gas-fired electricity. But nuclear power could have a social cost less than its competitors once due allowance is made for the value of carbon. Nuclear power emits substantially less CO 2 over its life cycle 31 than do fossil fuel energy sources. Table 6 shows emission factors for different fuel cycles. The implication is that, at the £70 tC social cost figure, nuclear power carries with it a 'carbon credit' of around 0.8 pence per kWh relative to natural gas, and over 1.5 pence per kWh relative to other fossil fuels. While these differentials are unlikely to make nuclear competitive in social cost terms compared to gas, they are very likely to tip the balance relative to other fossil fuels. If we adopt the maximum lower figure for the social cost of carbon suggested here, £15 tC, then the nuclear carbon credit is only 0.2 pence per kWh relative to gas, and 0.3 to 0.4 pence kWh relative to other fossil fuels. These differentials are unlikely to tip the balance between nuclear and its competitors. But enough has been said to show that the value of the marginal social cost of carbon matters significantly for the debate 29 That is, the increase in fuel duty over and above 1993 levels. The 1993 levels were not environmentally motivated. about the future of nuclear power in the UK. The 'official' value for carbon implies that that future is far more assured than if the lower values suggested here are used 32 . Green accounting and the social cost of carbon What value is chosen for the social cost of carbon also affects any attempt to modify the national economic accounts for environmental damage. Conventional accounting measures gross and net national product (GNP, NNP) but fail to deduct from these measures any environmental damage. There is now a substantial literature that makes these adjustments -see, for example, Atkinson et al. (1997) . The essential result is given by the identity:
where gNNP denotes 'green' net national product, d M is depreciation on conventional 'an-made' capital assets and d E is depreciation on environmental capital. d E would then be measured by the value of the economic rents from depleted natural resources and the value of pollution damage. Focusing solely on carbon emissions and using the £70 tC figure for marginal social cost of carbon produces the following results for the UK:
GNP in 2000 at 2000 prices = £890 billion CO 2 emissions in 2000 = 145 million tonnes C = £10,150 million = £10.15 billion
The £70 tC figure amounts to total damage equal to 1.1% of GNP, compared to just 0.2% if the lower value for carbon is used.
Green accounting need not be confined to nations. Damage estimates can also be used to adjust corporate accounts 33 . Atkinson (2000) reports adjusted accounts for UK electricity generator, Powergen. These suggest that, once pollution damage is subtracted from operating profits, the 32 A full analysis would also account for other greenhouse gases such as methane and also for conventional pollutants such as particulate matter and nitrogen oxides. 33 Note that the correct adjustment involves damage estimates, not control cost estimates as is commonly and erroneously done in some 'corporate sustainability' accounts. resulting measure of 'genuine savings' shows net losses from 1992-5, but a modest net gain in 1996. Effectively, Powergen was not 'sustainable' in social terms. Atkinson's value of carbon is £12 tC, so if this is raised to £70 tC, Powergen would be even less sustainable in the first few years and almost certainly for 1996 as well (Atkinson does not report emission figures).
Conclusions
The central conclusions from this discussion are:
(a) while the figures are necessarily uncertain, it is possible to estimate the aggregate and marginal social cost of greenhouse gas emissions; (b) the marginal social cost estimates have a role to play in appraising climate change policy, and especially in determining whether 'too much' or 'too little' abatement is being considered; (c) marginal social cost estimates are model-dependent. Recent models suggest quite wide ranges of estimates; (d) few early models incorporate adaptive behaviour, most being based on the 'dumb farmer syndrome'. Yet adaptation is clearly going to be an integral part of dealing with climate change; (e) those generally more recent models that have adaptive behaviour show marked reductions in social cost estimates relative to those without such behaviour. While adaptive models may be 'too optimistic', it is equally likely that non-adaptive models have been 'too pessimistic'; (f) recent models suggest a range for the marginal social cost of carbon, without equity weighting, of £3-6 tC. Equity weighting, using a marginal utility of income elasticity of unity, raises this range to £3-15 tC; (g) there is increasing evidence that the correct approach to discounting in the global warming context is to use a time-varying discount rate. Borrowing estimates from recent US work, the £3-15 tC range should be multiplied by around 1.8 to give a range of £4-27 tC; (h) A UK Government document, while not official in the sense of being a statement of government policy, opts for a central estimate of the marginal social cost of carbon of £70 tC. The difference reveals the sensitivity of the estimates to the model chosen. The chosen model in this case largely excludes adaptation; (i) At the lower set of estimates, UK policy in joining the EU in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol does not pass a cost-benefit test, and future Protocols or Amendments would be even less likely to pass a cost-benefit test. On the 'unofficial' UK government estimate of social cost, however, Kyoto would pass a cost-benefit test but the domestic 'target' of 20% reduction in carbon dioxide would not. Thus even this figure raises serious doubts about whether a second and third Protocol would meet the cost-benefit criterion. However, if time-varying discount rates are adopted, UK policy would pass a cost-benefit test both in terms of Kyoto and the 20% carbon reduction target; (j) The negative results for climate policy do not imply 'doing nothing' but rather point the way for a reappraisal of the balance between investing in emissions reduction and investing in adaptation, especially in developing countries; (k) Equity weighting has a strong utilitarian rationale to it, but the choice of the utility of income elasticity is more open that UK government documents suggest. More importantly, once equity weighting is accepted, as it appears to be in new UK Treasury appraisal guidance, it has to be applied consistently across all policies with distributive impacts within the UK and beyond. It is not defensible to argue that global warming is 'special' because the damage is the responsibility of the rich countries. Responsibility arguments are just as valid in other contexts such as aid and trade protection;
(l) There are other policy implications arising from the choice of a social cost of carbon measure. If energy policy was rationally decided on the basis of overall private plus external costs, the £70 tC figure would have major implications for nuclear power relative to other fossil fuels, and there would be a sizeable but probably undecisive credit compared to natural gas. As far as green accounting is concerned, the £70 tC figure also produces a fairly dramatic adjustment to GNP of over one per cent, ignoring all other pollutants. The £70 tC figure is also like to have potentially dramatic effects on the 'sustainability' of some corporations.
